Note: This text has been updated to reflect the content of the managers’ amendment released November 7, 2026.
A significant amount of fresh investment in U.S. grid capacity is undertaken by investor-owned utilities. These utility investments and the rates of return on them are regulated by state utility commissions and, for transmission, by FERC. The deal for particular utilities is straightforward: invest in and maintain critical assets in exchange for a consistent, but constrained, rate of return for utility investors paid for largely by their own ratepayers.
However, load growth is placing this model under strain as utilities are rewarded for pursuing high-cost, high-return solutions to upgrading their networks. One driver of these high-cost plans is that service territories do not line up with where new transmission lines and generators need to be built to provide more efficient service. As a result, utilities profit from securing capital-intensive solutions in their own territories over importing cheaper or already existing generation from other areas, raising costs for consumers. Utilities also have strong incentives to block or outright resist the development of resources that would see returns shift outside their service territories or threaten previous investments they made under prior regulatory compacts.
Moving utilities to adopt cost-effective solutions requires aligning interests to invest in more large-scale, interregional transmission and non-wire alternatives. The American grid requires large-scale upfront capital investments to handle technologies and loads that would collectively reshape the topology of the grid: renewables, clean firm, interregional transmission, data centers, and manufacturing. It is imperative that fresh waves of grid reforms provide certainty on how these projects will be planned, procured, permitted, and paid for.
In this piece, we detail provisions that align utility incentives with low-cost investment and constrain utilities’ ability to resist critical new projects. Collectively, the bill’s provisions present new tools for the federal and state governments to re-align investment and planning across multiple levels of grid governance so that investment is driven towards cheaper, scaled, and efficient energy infrastructure solutions across wider geographies. Much depends on the implementation and the rulemaking that would follow BAAJA’s passage, but the precedents are significant.
Advanced transmission technologies (ATTs). §2109 mandates that utilities use ATTs, including advanced conductors, whenever benefits exceed cost to maximize the grid capacity on new, modified, upgraded, replaced, and reconductored projects. The bill instructs FERC to issue a rule mandating regular benefit-cost evaluations by FERC-jurisdictional utilities of all technically achievable opportunities to deploy ATTs, and that ATTs must be utilized if they score above 1.0. If utilities do not use ATTs under these circumstances, their return on equity (ROE), the return paid to shareholders, is subject to penalties. The bill creates a clear mandate to ensure utilities maximize opportunities to get additional capacity out of their grid projects.
Utility referrals to FERC for inadequate planning. Under BAAJA, FERC must adopt rules for state commissions to refer utility planning and development processes for local transmission facilities to FERC with a description of the process, the harm it presents to consumers, and their prior efforts to resolve it. Local facilities are those located solely within a utility’s retail service territory and not selected in a regional plan for cost allocation. The new oversight provisions cover replacement of these facilities, so would include asset-condition and end-of-life replacements. FERC then sends an investigative team (including state appointees) which issues a report on the utility’s process. If that process is found not to be selecting more efficient or cost-effective facilities or to be interfering with regional planning, FERC can levy civil penalties of up to $5 million per local facility, credited to the transmission customers who bore the costs of that facility. Other possible disciplinary actions include eliminating the presumption of prudence that benefits utility planning in rate-basing decisions (meaning utilities must work harder to justify their plans) and reducing allowable returns on equity from local facilities. The referral process gives states another tool by which to pressure utilities to align their planning with regional efforts at building a cost-efficient grid. Those regional efforts are, in turn, positively influenced by new interregional and applicant-driven processes created by BAAJA (see below).
Federal ROFR removal. Under BAAJA, utilities no longer have a federal right of first refusal on facilities selected in regional or interregional transmission plans for the purposes of cost allocation, with exceptions in FERC’s current orders. That is, if a region is pursuing a set of lines, utilities cannot use federal law to automatically insist that they be the ones to develop said lines in their service territories. This provision locks in competition for projects selected in regional and interregional plans. (FERC Order 1000 eliminated this ROFR, but BAAJA writes the elimination into statute. Note that state right-of-first-refusal laws are not altered.)
Utilities and DERs. BAAJA allows qualifying distributed energy facilities to receive access to RTO / ISO energy, capacity, and ancillary-service markets, opening the way for new forms of aggregation to seek additional customers. Facilities must be able to deliver electricity within 15 minutes and be between 5 kW and 5 MW. Aggregations (sometimes called virtual power plants) must be at least 100 kW. As many of these resources must be built through or alongside significant distribution utility investments, the bill places several obligations and restrictions on utilities in RTO markets. Distribution utilities in RTO territories must interconnect behind-the-meter resources in a timely manner, allow export of power from those resources, and cannot impede market participation. These obligations apply unless state law or the state regulator provides otherwise. FERC can enforce these provisions.
BAAJA also creates a voluntary DOE program for streamlining local permitting for distributed energy resources. Given the proliferation of utility-led distribution aggregation models (e.g., efforts by Sparkfund and Xcel Energy in Minnesota), these market access provisions stand to give utilities and their competitors in RTO territories further incentive to procure distributed resources at scale and earn revenues on wholesale markets.
Large loads. Under BAAJA, FERC must revise its pricing policy and issue a rule requiring new and existing data centers to pay both embedded and incremental transmission costs. Separately, a new statutory floor bars shifting incremental costs of serving new data centers of any size (transmission, distribution, storage, generation) onto other customers. Collected revenues above incremental cost can be credited to other customers’ bills. See our piece on BAAJA’s transmission provisions and on provisions forcing data centers to pay more for rate relief and investment.
The bill also leaves states considerable leeway to impose additional costs on large loads over and above this requirement. This is a legal framework to limit sudden and sharp cost increases on consumers and give states new tools to manage their growth, such as open seasons, bring-your-own-generation, or conditioning service on limited transmission service.
New planning and permitting pathways. The new interregional transmission planning requirement and applicant-driven process for transmission lines provide additional pathways for long-distance transmission to get built. As utilities are members of the transmission planning regions that face new interregional planning requirements, the changes will impact both utility and commission thinking on the viability of more localized investments (the exceptions to this are RUS-financed cooperatives and public-power instrumentalities unless they opt in). These investments (smaller transmission or distribution lines, localized generation) are often pursued on the assumption that larger-scale projects are difficult if not impossible to pursue (even for the utility itself to participate in). Changing that assumption by establishing a clear framework for large-scale infrastructure development therefore stands to shift investment incentives across the electricity system towards scaled and more efficient alternatives. Interregional lines may also be increasingly favored by utilities because securing cost allocation for those lines has now been made independent of the permitting processes those lines go through. A separate consolidated planning process requires fixed, subregional, upfront per-MW interconnection charges for generation and storage in ISO and RTO regions. This provides another avenue for rationalizing investments and saving capital costs. Finally, the confirmation of FERC’s authority over ISO and RTO corporate governance provides another avenue to check utility influence over regional boards.

